

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Friday 19 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

(Burma)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO  
Mr. J. MACHADO LOPES  
Mr. E. MOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV  
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV  
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U MAUNG MAUNG CYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA  
Mr. V. FECHOTA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. A. MIXULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij-Mikael IMRU  
Ato M. HAMID  
Ato M. CHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALE  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. O. NEDA

Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Mr. M. STAHL

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. S. LÖFGREN

Union of SovietSocialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.F. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. R. A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative of  
the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the one hundred and twenty-second plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): At the last meeting of the Committee at which collateral measures were considered, on 5 April, the Soviet representative made a rather lengthy statement (ENDC/PV.118, p.36 et seq.) which included some comments on certain United States proposals (ENDC/70) for reduction of the risk of war through accident miscalculation or failure of communications. During the course of those comments he gave the Conference the welcome news that the Soviet Government was prepared to consider favourably the establishment of a direct communications link between the United States and the Soviet Governments (ENDC/PV.118, p.52). As I indicated on that occasion (ibid., p.55), the United States warmly welcomes that action. The United States delegation has since held informal conversations with the Soviet delegation on the subject, and we believe that at present informal consultation of that type is the procedure most likely to hasten progress. I am sure that both our delegations will wish to keep this Committee informed at appropriate times as our discussions develop.

While I would not, therefore, wish to discuss today specific questions concerning a direct communications link, I should like to comment on some of the general remarks which Mr. Tsarapkin made on 5 April about the position of the United States on measures to reduce the risk of war.

We believe it is important that the Governments concerned should understand each other's views on this problem clearly. Mr. Tsarapkin stated on that occasion (ibid., p.49) that the United States proposals, when taken out of the context of general and complete disarmament, are inadequate to preclude the risk of war, and that as long as disarmament has not begun and the arms race has not been halted the risk of war remains.

I would say to the Soviet Union representative that there is no argument between us on that, except perhaps that the United States delegation would wish to make the point even stronger and to say that the risk of war will not be precluded even with the beginning of disarmament, but only by completion of those disarmament measures which will remove entirely the present ominous capacities of both sides to wage war and provide adequate international machinery for maintaining

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peace. It is because we recognize that fact that the United States working paper on the subject contains in its title the words "reduction" -- I repeat, "reduction" -- "of the risk of war".

I have dwelt on that point because I want to make clear to the Committee, and to the Soviet delegation in particular, the perspective in which we view these measures. They are not measures that will eliminate the risk of war. The only measures that will do that are those on our agenda in the discussion of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. Tsarapkin seemed to believe that some of the measures in that field proposed by the United States were set forth to create an illusion of guarantees against the outbreak of war. The Soviet delegation and the Soviet Government should clearly understand that that is not our motive and does not correspond with our beliefs concerning the threat posed by the arms race. Let me say at this time -- for I think it is appropriate -- that when the happy day comes when we achieve our first agreement on an initial measure or measures of disarmament one danger we must guard against is the danger of complacency. We must not allow any initial measure of limited success to lull us into a relaxation of our efforts to move on to more significant disarmament measures, for no initial measure, whether it be a test ban, a direct communications link or any other measure, will eliminate the dangers of our present situation or remove the need for even more intensive negotiation of more far-reaching measures. But this warning applies to all initial measures, not merely to measures to reduce the risk of war, and certainly it should not be an argument against doing what we can to achieve limited immediate break-throughs.

I have spoken at some length about what the measures we propose to reduce the risk of war would not do -- and I might add, parenthetically, that to limit the claims for one's own proposal is a "first" of some sort for our discussions here. But I have done it so that the Soviet delegation and Government should not misunderstand our motives and our intentions. I have also, on previous occasions, emphasized that we do not view our proposals as competing with other proposed disarmament measures that might be undertaken prior to the initiation of general disarmament. We view them as proposals that seem so clearly in the common interest that they can be undertaken without delay, and as proposals which are of such a nature that their negotiation would not need to compete with other measures for the time of this Committee.

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Having set forth those general considerations, I should now like to discuss some of the specific concerns expressed by the Soviet representative regarding the United States proposals on advance notification of military movements (ENDC/70, p.4) and on the exchange of military missions (ibid., pp.8-10), and I should like also to offer for consideration some additional thoughts on the latter.

On 5 April, Mr. Tsarapkin said that under present conditions an agreement to exchange advance notification of major military movements could not "... serve as a guarantee against surprise attack" (ENDC/PV.118, p.50). That statement would seem to indicate some misunderstanding of our proposal. It is not intended to afford a guarantee against surprise attack: it is intended, rather, to reduce the danger of misunderstanding that might arise from the detection by one side of an unannounced major activity by the other side, and thus to reduce the danger of disproportionate response and counter-response. The measure is not intended to guard any State against another State's action, but rather to afford to each State a mechanism, predetermined procedure, which it can use in order to give another State sufficient cause to forgo counter military movements. I hope this clarification of purpose will be helpful to the Soviet delegation in its further assessment of our proposal.

The Soviet representative voiced concern also about the proposal for advance notification. He said (ibid.) that under present conditions, in which the arms race continues, advance notification could be used by a State preparing an attack as a manoeuvre to deceive an intended victim. In support of his concern, he added that that would be possible because with today's strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons not much time is required to achieve combat readiness.

On that last point, I should have thought it was obvious to all that there are various levels of readiness and that, in preventing unintended war, it would be important to give the reassurance resulting from advance notification that would allow the other side to avoid precipitate movements of its forces. Let me say, however, that the question Mr. Tsarapkin raised -- that of possible deception by a notifying State in order, as he said, "to divert attention from the direction of the main blow" (ibid.)-- is a legitimate question to raise. It is one we considered in formulating our proposal, but we concluded, as we hope the Soviet Government will conclude after further consideration, that it is a concern which is more apparent than real and not one which should preclude further consideration of the subject. I shall not dwell at length

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on that point now, but I would point out that deception through efforts to give false impressions of intentions would most probably be attempted by any aggressor, and that those efforts would not require or be assisted by arrangements for advance notification. In fact, if time were given for more careful reflection concerning reported movements, not only would the likelihood of misinterpretation be lessened -- which is the purpose of the arrangement -- but also there would be less chance that a notified nation would be deceived by movements that came to its attention. After all, we would not expect to relax and issue five days of leave to military personnel when notifications of movement by the other side were received, nor would we expect the Soviet Government to do so.

However, the main point that I should like to make in this connexion is that it does seem that the kind of considerations the Soviet representative has raised could properly be examined further in order to determine whether it was possible to develop arrangements, acceptable to the governments concerned, which would improve upon and regularize a practice that already exists, though it varies from State to State. The practice does exist, and it exists for very good reasons -- reasons that are counter to the concerns expressed by the Soviet representative. Could we not, therefore, explore the possibilities? We sincerely believe that that is a measure in which there is a common interest.

I should like now to resume discussion of the third proposal on reduction of the risk of war that is common to both disarmament plans (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.14; ENDC/30, p.12): the proposal for the exchange of military missions. On 29 March my delegation set forth (ENDC/PV.115, p.17) the rationale of that proposal. We thought we had made clear its permissive character. Indeed, we thought we had made it clear that it was the most permissive in character of the three proposals; that it was an arrangement that would be for such use as the host country might desire to make of it. It was therefore somewhat difficult for my delegation to understand the concerns expressed by the Soviet delegation at our meeting on 5 April. The Soviet delegation seemed concerned that such missions would make it their purpose to carry out military espionage. That concern, once again, leaves an impression that there exists some misunderstanding of our proposal, a misunderstanding both of the purpose and of the modalities of the proposed arrangement.

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Let me therefore recapitulate our suggestion briefly, and offer some additional thoughts. We believe it would be desirable, in the first instance, for the exchange of missions to take place between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States. Such an arrangement would not, of course, preclude subsequent similar arrangements between other States and those two Governments. The arrangement should be such that its continuation would be dependent upon the continuing belief of both parties that it was serving a useful purpose.

The main function of the special missions would be verification of the state of affairs that the host country would like to have reported authentically to the other country, in circumstances where assertions by the host country might not by themselves be completely convincing. Thus the purpose would be to avoid exaggerated impressions of the imminence of war or of preparation to initiate war, and perhaps to facilitate some secure relaxation of military preparations on both sides in time of crisis. Hence it might be said that the normal role of a mission would be that of a stand-by team, available to be called on to witness activity or the absence of activity when it was in the interest — I repeat, when it was in the interest — of the host country to provide such evidence and when satisfactory evidence could not be provided except through skilled, trustworthy and authentically identified officials of the government receiving the evidence.

It is completely true that the utility of the mission would be dependent upon the attitude of the host government. For its part, the United States believes it would be of value to us to have present a Soviet mission to which we could convey accurately the true meaning of our aims and actions and, where appropriate, provide verification of those aims and actions.

We believe it is most important that the Soviet Government should understand the distinction we are making between two types of verification. One is where a verification arrangement seeks to get at the truth in spite of a government's possible efforts to conceal it. The other is a verification arrangement that helps a government to display the facts of a situation when that government believes that it is in its own interest that the facts be known.

It is, of course, true that a mission could not on its own take the absence of suspicious activities as a basis for reporting "All is well". Its role would be that of a trained and reasonably sceptical witness, to which the host country could provide positive evidence or reasonable opportunity to satisfy itself.

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Since what would be desired would be information which the host government wished to give to the mission for purposes of reassurance, there would be no objection to --- and indeed there would be value in --- having host government personnel accompany mission members on such occasions as the host government might wish to use the mission.

As a further consideration, I believe it is obvious that the military missions could contribute substantially to the value of a direct communications link. While the United States has made it clear that it is prepared and eager to establish a direct communications link as a separate measure, there is in principle an inherent relation between the two proposals since the motive for observation in a particular instance might well arise from an exchange of messages between governments. If the direct communications link were in fact used as a means of clarifying ambiguous evidence, explaining certain steps that had been taken, or proposing actions that might reduce misapprehension, the special missions could participate in the communications process. If, for example, certain military dispositions were to be explained, having one's own military experts available at the other end of the line might greatly facilitate the communication.

We believe it is important that the Soviet delegation and its Government should understand that we are suggesting the exchange of special military missions rather than merely augmentation of embassy attachés, as a means of emphasizing the special function we envisage for the missions, that of clarification and reassurance, and availability to serve the host country. Thus the missions themselves would have every incentive to think imaginatively about the special tasks that they might be called upon to perform. Likewise, establishment of the special missions would help to keep host governments alive to their main purpose and to a host government's responsibility to make the best possible use of them. In addition, we believe, the potential value of such exchanges in improving relations and mutual understanding between the two governments should not be underestimated.

Surely, if the nature of the exchange we propose is fully understood, there can be no concern about espionage. It would be an arrangement where the value of the mission would depend upon its rapport with the host government, and where the continuation of the arrangement would be contingent upon its continuing acceptability to both governments. Under those conditions any attempt to use the arrangement for espionage would be ineffective, counter-productive and in fact absurd.

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This measure, which admittedly is experimental, would offer a very real possibility of further reduction of the risk of war while we seek agreement on significant measures of disarmament that will enable us eventually to remove the risk of war. Indeed it might well facilitate our disarmament efforts, for it could well tend to improve relations between the two Governments.

I would urge the Soviet delegation to give serious thought to the proposal and to discuss it with us. What harm can there be in a further discussion of the subject to see if any concerns that might exist can be met, and thus if mutually acceptable arrangements can be concluded?

We believe that on 5 April we moved a step forward. Let us explore together whether there is another step forward that can be taken now so that a momentum of movement can be established, for momentum may well be what is most required. It might prove to be the catalyst we need to stimulate rapid progress in our main task: disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I do not wish to take up too much of the Committee's time this morning. I have asked for the floor because some of the statements we heard at the last two meetings suggest a few brief comments to me. I refer to the concern which some delegations of non-aligned countries have recently expressed about the slow progress and lack of constructiveness in our work. Their concern is quite understandable and may even be useful as a stimulant and incentive to further effort on our part; such is the main interpretation that the Italian delegation places on it.

While I personally share the regrets expressed by those delegations I cannot support pessimistic views on the progress achieved by our Conference. We certainly come up against difficulties and obstacles; but we knew from the start that our task was more difficult than any ever entrusted to negotiators. No-one was unaware that the solution of the difficulties would take much time and patience. In problems so delicate as ours, no immediate or rapid results could be expected. None the less, the very fact that our efforts are unremitting proves the desire of all of us here assembled to achieve an agreement. Our discussions are tenacious but relaxed. We are making every effort, at least we on the Western side to understand others' views while upholding our own, not for the pleasure of arguing

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but in order to reach agreement. The adjustments made and the, sometimes remarkable, changes that conflicting arguments have gradually undergone prove that we are engaged in real negotiations, not attending a debating club.

Our Conference set itself two objectives at the outset: the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament and the conclusion of agreements on collateral measures of disarmament. It was generally agreed that these measures should have produced immediate results in improving the atmosphere and opening the way to complete disarmament.

We must ask ourselves whether we have worked hard enough at the second of these tasks. Maybe we have been wrong -- I am accusing no-one but merely stating facts -- in rather neglecting collateral measures. The Committee of the Whole, as we know, has held very few meetings, and it was only very recently that the Conference resumed consideration of collateral measures. It is fair to say that once the Committee began to discuss them again it achieved an initial agreement in principle: that concerning direct communications between Moscow and Washington (ENDC/PV.118, p.52).

That agreement is not unimportant. The Press announced it throughout the world as a significant event. It gives us the assurance that if an international crisis should occur -- it is to be hoped not, but the possibility is always there -- consultation machinery would come into operation. Direct consultations would take place immediately between the Powers equipped with the deadliest weapons, enabling a solution to be found and any chance of misunderstanding to be removed.

There must be no delay in perfecting the details of this agreement in principle which has been achieved. I venture to hope that we shall deal briefly and expeditiously with the subject, so that the Committee can send a supplementary report on it to the United Nations without delay.

Regarding the risks of war by accident, the Western delegations have made other proposals (see ENDC/70) besides that concerning direct communications between Moscow and Washington. Mr. Stelle again dealt at length with these proposals this morning (supra. pp.5 et s.) The Soviet delegation has not yet seen fit to accept them. I hope that the reply is not final, and that the Soviet delegation will agree to

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look more closely at these proposals and to go into them thoroughly with us. It should not be always seeing evil intentions behind the proposals we put forward. There is a certain contradiction in the Soviet delegation's attitude. Sometimes it attaches the highest importance to the signature of a treaty, which, it suggests, will always be fully and most faithfully observed. But on the other hand it believes that the exchange of military missions we propose is only a cover for espionage, or that the exchange of military information would only serve the better to camouflage the Western Powers' aggressive or criminal intentions. May I ask the Soviet delegation to go more carefully into the Western delegations' proposals with us so that we may together seek ways and means of allaying its fears and suspicions?

Again, the Committee now has before it a long list of collateral measures proposed by both sides (ENDC/C.1/2). The Canadian delegation recently drew attention (ENDC/PV.118, p.6) to a proposal concerning outer space (ENDC/17) that should certainly be examined by our Committee, since an agreement on that subject would kill the fears that weigh so heavily on mankind. Several delegations of non-aligned countries have also referred in our general discussions to certain collateral measures which they regard favourably and consider useful.

I refuse to believe that, given goodwill, we cannot ultimately arrive at an agenda for our work on collateral measures. In that field, as in others, the contribution of the delegations of the non-aligned countries, which has already proved very useful, would be invaluable. I would recall that it was at the Swedish delegation's request that the Western delegations agreed to divide the text of their proposal on the risks of a war by accident and surprise attacks into two parts and declared their readiness to discuss the first part only.

As is well known, my delegation -- like, I believe, all others -- thinks very highly of the contribution the delegations of the non-aligned countries make to our discussions. I wish personally to reiterate this point with the deepest conviction with special reference to collateral measures.

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Mr. Godber said here one day, I think, that the disarmament treaty signed will be neither the text proposed by the United States Government (ENDC/30) nor that proposed by the Soviet Government (ENDC/2/Rev.1), but rather the result of a general co-operative effort. The same, to my mind, applies to collateral measures. They must not be only those proposed by us or by the delegations of the socialist countries; they must emerge from a common effort and contribution and from collaboration among all the delegations.

As I have said, I understand the concern of some of the delegations of the non-aligned countries regarding the slowness of our work. Let us together seek through collateral measures the short-cut to initial results, which would have the immense advantage of beginning to restore confidence between East and West. This is the main problem which we have still been unable to solve, although our Conference already in itself undeniably represents a step towards drawing together and mutual understanding.

The representative of Brazil, Mr. de Melo Franco, has very rightly reminded the Committee (ENDC/PV.121, pp. 5-6) of the Sovereign Pontiff's peace appeal to the whole world.

I am sure that appeal was listened to here by all with respect and without regard to religious beliefs, because it expressed the aspirations of all the peoples of the world. We in Italy were deeply moved by the Pope's words. We find in them a strong incentive to the action which the Italian Government intends, and always has intended, in participating in this Conference.

As Pope John XXIII said, our first object must be to restore mutual confidence and love between human beings. That is the task and aim to which we have devoted every effort here, striving without intransigence or rigidity to reach an initial concrete agreement on disarmament and agreements which will be the tangible proof of our goodwill and which will help us gradually to establish the new world.

The Italian delegation deeply regrets that these agreements have not yet been reached. The Committee has run up against inflexible and intransigent attitudes, which the Italian delegation has repeatedly denounced. The Committee's work has been held up by sterile and tiresome polemics. But the Italian delegation intends

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patiently and steadfastly to continue making every possible effort to achieve progress in all sectors, especially on collateral measures. It is convinced that no delegation, not even those which have shown understandable concern, will want to relax effort.

I am sure that all delegations will avoid being discouraged by difficulties and will redouble their efforts and make their positive contribution to this Conference, fully conscious of their responsibilities and of the grave matters at stake in the Committee.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French). Before beginning my speech, I should like to say with what interest I listened to the remarks of our Italian colleague, Mr. Cavalletti. I fully share his feeling that we should not be discouraged by the dilatory pace of our work, and I also hope with him that we shall soon be making progress.

I agree with him that the importance of collateral measures cannot be overestimated. I think that there we can make progress, which will certainly have a salutary effect in advancing all the Committee's activities.

I was interested in what our Italian colleague had to say about the problem before the Committee of the Whole, that is, the Committee which has to deal with collateral measures, but noted that he mentioned only the proposals submitted by the Western Powers. He said we should all make an effort to reach agreement on these proposals and that the final result should be one achieved by joint effort. I might also rightly have expected him to mention the proposals submitted here by the socialist delegations. I regret that he did not refer to them at all. I agree with him that these collateral measures are of great importance, and it is to one of the proposals I have mentioned that I should like to devote my statement today.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to devote my statement to a few general remarks regarding the proposal submitted by the Soviet delegation for a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77). I should like to explain the reasons

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for the Polish delegation's support of that proposal. I should also like to take this opportunity to make a few comments on the questions raised by the Western delegations during the earlier discussion on this subject.

I think we are all agreed that the greatest danger now threatening mankind is the danger of a nuclear conflict. We should therefore all be equally interested in measures which might ward off that danger. This is clearly something that can be accomplished, even before the process of general and complete disarmament begins, by introducing a series of military measures. That is the context of the proposals submitted to the Committee by the delegations of the Soviet Union and Poland, namely, the draft declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75), and the plan for creating a denuclearized zone in central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1).

But the same objective can be pursued through political and juridical measures. Juridical barriers can be raised so as to prevent a dispute from degenerating into a test of nuclear force. A juridical structure can be built to facilitate the solution of controversial problems. The general rules of international law can be translated into concrete juridical norms and given the status of principles governing the conduct of nations in their mutual relations.

That is the role which should and could be played by a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Such a pact would have, in our view, two functions to fulfil. First, the States would obtain institutional means for mutual consultation whereby to meet any situation that might endanger the maintenance of peace and security. Secondly, such a pact, by committing the States concerned to settle any conflict arising between them solely by peaceful means, would thus create a framework for the solution of all outstanding problems.

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In the Polish delegation's view, the combination of these two elements represents the greatest merit of the Soviet proposal and distinguishes the model pact before the Committee from similar pacts concluded in the past. The Soviet proposal simultaneously provides for both preventive measures and measures guaranteeing States the possibility of settling peacefully all conflicts and situations jeopardizing peace.

Thus a non-aggression pact so conceived would in the present situation fulfil some of the functions of a mutual security agreement between the States comprising the two political and military groupings. It would give the signatory States a greater sense of security. It would enable them to evaluate the movements and actions of the other side with greater objectivity and in a calmer atmosphere. It would considerably diminish the possibility of a conflict provoked by a single State. By stating the principle of the joint obligation on the parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to resolve all conflicts by peaceful means and to abstain from any aggression and any threat of recourse to force or use of force, a non-aggression pact could prevent the expansion of a bilateral conflict into a wider conflict.

Since relations between the two groups referred to in the Soviet proposal constitute today the decisive element in the development of the international situation, the conclusion of such a pact would go far beyond the regional framework and fulfil the functions of an agreement implementing the general principles of collective security.

The Western Powers have adopted towards the Soviet proposal an attitude which can only be described as strange. Although in the past -- from the time of the submission of the Eden Plan in 1955 until the last exchange of correspondence between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1962 (ENDC/73 and 74) -- these Powers have on many occasions declared their support for the idea of such a pact, now that the socialist countries want to give the idea concrete form they meet with a refusal based on all sorts of objections of procedure and substance. Let me refer briefly to some of these objections.

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We are told, for example, that such a pact is premature and that it should constitute the culmination of a process of implementing all sorts of collateral measures of disarmament. On that point I should like to express the Polish delegation's belief that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between parties to the Warsaw Treaty and parties to the North Atlantic Treaty cannot be made conditional on the implementation of other measures. That procedure would actually be tantamount to deferring the signature of such a pact to a time when it would be less useful than now. The priority of collateral measures of disarmament should be determined in the light of the needs emerging from the present international situation. If we are agreed that the present mistrust between the two political and military groupings is an impediment to progress in disarmament, and if we agree that confidence must be restored, then we should acknowledge the urgent necessity of using each and every means to achieve the objective in the shortest possible time.

A non-aggression pact could undoubtedly exercise a great influence on the international climate and reduce the tension under which we live. That is why we think that its conclusion should not only be deferred but be recognized as a preliminary measure in the series of collateral measures of disarmament before the Committee.

We are also told that historical experience is against the Soviet draft non-aggression pact. It is obviously very easy to cite a goodly number of non-aggression pacts that were cynically broken. But my reply to that objection would be that the effectiveness of a non-aggression pact, as of any other international agreement, may to some extent depend upon the wording of its clauses -- though that is not the determining factor. An agreement is coloured above all by its objective, and its effectiveness must in the last analysis depend on the will of the signatory countries and the compatibility between the objective and that will. A non-aggression pact is nothing more than a manifestation or expression of a desire to abide by pledges given and rules acknowledged. Its real value is

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reflected in the actions that follow it. We do not regard a non-aggression pact as a panacea for the ills that beset the world today. Such a pact will not replace the peace treaty which must be concluded with Germany or the solution of the problem of West Berlin. It is not an instrument that can be substituted for a treaty to mark the liquidation of the vestiges of the Second World War and the recognition of present frontiers in Europe. Nor will a non-aggression treaty diminish the danger to world peace inherent in the strategic plans of the Western Powers and the atomic armament of the Bundeswehr.

I have said what the non-aggression pact we propose will not do, thus following the example of the United States representative, who enjoined us to be more modest. But we are convinced that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact may mark a turning point in East-West relations. It may start a movement towards solving problems that have been shelved for too long.

There, Mr. Chairman, we come to the heart of the problem, because whatever the terms and arguments used, the attitude to the question of concluding a non-aggression pact reflects the position on the question of normalizing and stabilizing the European situation.

Such stabilization primarily implies acceptance of the political and juridical status created in central Europe as a consequence of the defeat of Hitler's Germany and of the later developments which resulted in the establishment of two German States: the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. The policy of the Western Powers always seems to be based on refusal to recognize the situation. I have no intention of going into an analysis of the reasons for that policy here. But it is a fact that the representatives of the Western Powers cannot deny. Well, that policy is clearly preventing the stabilization of peace in Europe and encouraging all who base their hopes on thoughts of revenge. Lasting international tension is propitious only to the interests of the militarists and revanchists of the Federal Republic of Germany, and it is not a mere coincidence

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that we find in Federal Germany the bitterest opponents of a non-aggression pact and the warmest supporters of a continuing state of insecurity that would justify the armaments race with the participation of the Bundeswehr.

Whether we like it or not, the attitude of Western Germany to a non-aggression pact between the parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty can be interpreted only as reflecting their attitude to questions of war and peace. A country whose foreign policy is peaceful can have no other interest than the stabilization and normalization of international relations.

On the other hand, refusal to participate in a non-aggression commitment can be nothing other than an expression of the desire to change the existing state of affairs by each and every means, including the use of force.

Such, Mr. Chairman, is the background against which discussion of the draft submitted by the Soviet delegation is taking place.

The non-aggression pact offers us all a chance to make a great stride forward to peace.

I dare believe that the Western Powers have not yet spoken their last word. I continue to hope that their representatives are prepared for a constructive discussion with us which will enable us to reach an agreement that will undoubtedly have a most salutary effect on all the Committee's activities.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today the Committee is continuing the discussion of measures aimed at lessening international tension and facilitating the implementation of disarmament. Although discussion of this subject at the present session of the Committee is still in fact only in its early stages, we can already see two fundamentally different approaches to the solution of the problems connected with lessening the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. One approach is that adhered to by the delegations of the socialist countries, who have submitted to the Committee important and

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well-grounded proposals which are truly in keeping with the task of averting the threat of war and easing international tension. Among such proposals we can undoubtedly include the draft non-aggression pact between the member countries of NATO and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty (ENDC/77) and also the draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for the stationing of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75). Also of great importance is the proposal for the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, a proposal referred to at the meeting of the Committee on 5 April by the representative of the People's Republic of Poland. (ENDC/PV.118, p.15 et seq.)

The Soviet Government has over several years frequently advocated the creation of such zones. In particular, at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly the Soviet Union gave its full support to the proposal of the African States for making Africa a denuclearized zone. We believe that the implementation of this proposal would be a good beginning in regard to establishing similar zones in other parts of the world, that it would be a considerable step towards preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and would substantially improve the political atmosphere, not only in Africa but throughout the world.

Only the enemies of peace, the enemies of the African peoples, can be opposed to this peace-loving initiative of the African States. At the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly we saw how the United Kingdom, France, the United States of America, Spain, Portugal and Belgium -- which, as you know, are colonial Powers -- opposed the adoption of this proposal and put pressure on the other delegations, thereby clearly demonstrating before the whole world the true essence and aims of their policy in Africa. In spite of their opposition, the resolution on the creation of a denuclearized zone in Africa was adopted by the Assembly (A/RES/1652(XVI)). However, the Western Powers, ignoring this decision of the United Nations and trampling underfoot the interests of the security and well-being of the peoples of Africa, continue to use the land of Africa for their

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military purposes, thus creating an obvious threat to the African States. We have, moreover, seen how one of the NATO Powers, France, with the support and approval of its other NATO allies, is continuing to use African territory as a testing ground for the improvement of nuclear weapons. It is time the Western Powers realized that the age of colonialism has gone for ever, that they must comply with the demands of the African countries and delete the African continent from their military plans.

While speaking of the Soviet Union's attitude to the creation of denuclearized zones, I should also like to recall that the Soviet Union supported a plan (A/C. 1/L.297) submitted at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly by non-aligned States, some of which are members of the present Committee, namely the UNDEN plan, which in fact, as its sponsors explained (A/C.1/SR.1196, paras.1-3), provided for the creation of a broad denuclearized belt throughout the world.

The Soviet Government attaches particular importance to the implementation of plans to create denuclearized zones in those areas where the opposing military groupings are in contiguity and where the danger of the outbreak of war exists. This applies, in particular, to Central Europe. That is why the Soviet delegation fully and wholeheartedly supports the proposal of the People's Republic of Poland, known as the Rapacki plan (A/PV.697, para.136 - ENDC/C.1/1), for the creation of a denuclearized zone comprising the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland. If the Western Powers desire to reduce tension in Europe they too should, in our opinion, support this plan, the implementation of which would be a serious contribution to the strengthening of security and peace not only in Europe but beyond its confines.

Completely different is the approach to the solution of the problems connected with lessening the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war which we observe on the part of the Western Powers. They have shown themselves to be stubborn opponents of serious and effective measures which would lead to a lessening of the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. They try to reduce the matter to very limited, and sometimes to purely trivial measures or even to measures which, divorced from disarmament, might play into the hands of any party contemplating aggression and do definite harm to the interests of the security of peace-loving States.

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At the meeting on 5 April devoted to measures aimed at lessening the danger of the outbreak of war, the Soviet delegation showed a constructive approach also to other proposals which might be useful to some extent, however slight. In doing so the Soviet delegation expressed the hope (ENDC/PV.118, p.53) that the Western Powers — which up to the present have either rejected or avoided discussion of the proposals of the Soviet Union concerning collateral measures aimed at promoting an improvement in the international situation — would reconsider their position and that it would be possible to begin really serious negotiations which would lead to agreement and thus to a lessening of the danger of war.

Unfortunately, however, the Western Powers continue to adhere to a different approach to these problems. We have not heard any constructive statements whatsoever from the representatives of the Western Powers. Either they remain silent or they flatly reject the Soviet proposals.

The Western Powers have in fact adopted a negative attitude to the Soviet Union's proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member countries of NATO and the countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty. While apparently not rejecting this proposal outright, they try at the same time to frustrate discussion of this question in the Committee. Significant in this regard was the statement made by one of the Western delegations at the last meeting devoted to the question of measures aimed at the lessening of international tension.

I am referring to the statement made on 5 April by the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti. If one reads through this statement carefully, one finds that, actually, it says nothing new. In fact, Mr. Cavalletti does not bring forward any arguments against the Soviet proposal although, as his statement shows, he is opposed to the conclusion of such a pact. Moreover, Mr. Cavalletti resorts to a rather banal method: to avoid serious consideration of this question in the Committee he does not reject the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact, but at the same time he tries to prove that the time has not yet come for the implementation of such a measure.

"... we do not exclude the possibility of an exchange, well-timed and in the most appropriate and effective framework, of solemn declarations between East and West. But such declarations can only be given substance

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and made logical and understandable, if initially based on concrete facts. That will be the real proof of all-round good will. Declarations or pacts will stem almost naturally from the facts." (EWDC/PV.118, p.29)

This statement sums up all the Western Powers' arguments against the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Let us, therefore, take a closer look at Mr. Cavalletti's statement and let us see what follows from it. First, he considers that now is not an appropriate time for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Then one might ask you, Mr. Cavalletti, when indeed will the appropriate time come? We have already witnessed a number of crises, each of which brought the world to the brink of a thermonuclear war. The latest of these crises, the Caribbean crisis, was particularly significant in this respect. It made even the heads of the Western Powers speak of the need for urgent measures aimed at improving relations between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries. But now that the threat of the crisis has passed over, we are told that the time has not yet come for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.

This is a dangerous argument, dangerous because it is aimed at allowing events to develop in a direction leading to a further intensification of international tension, and in the final analysis, to the plunging of the world into the abyss of a nuclear disaster. If one follows Mr. Cavalletti's logic, it is precisely when the world has already been plunged into the abyss of a nuclear disaster that the time will have arrived for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. But that is an absurd position. We believe that it is precisely now when the danger of a further arms race, the danger of the further intensification of international tension and the danger of the cold war are generally acknowledged, that the time has come to take a serious step towards lessening international tension and strengthening confidence among States. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, such a step would be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

In his statement the representative of Italy demanded proof of "goodwill" as a preliminary condition for the conclusion of a pact. From whom did he demand proof of goodwill? From the Soviet Union. But really, Mr. Cavalletti, what grounds have you for putting such demands to the Soviet Union? Are the Western Powers encircled

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by a ring of Soviet bases? No, the exact contrary is the case. It is the Soviet Union and the socialist States that are encircled along their whole perimeter by a ring of United States military bases equipped with nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Has the Soviet Union officially proclaimed as its doctrine the policy "from a position of strength"? No, Mr. Cavalletti, it is the Western NATO Powers that have done so. Is it the Soviet Union that, violating the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/1762(XVII) - ENDC/63) and ignoring the demands of the peoples, continues to carry out nuclear weapon tests? No, Mr. Cavalletti, it is not the Soviet Union but the Western nuclear Powers that are doing so.

While the representatives of the NATO Powers in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in Geneva talk profusely about peace, the most responsible leaders of the NATO Powers are assigning amongst themselves the targets for a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

While the Western delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee are making unctuous speeches about the need to avert the threat of nuclear war and are not sparing of their assurances of the peaceful intentions of the Western countries, in the NATO headquarters the Generals are marking arrows on their maps to show the direction of NATO's nuclear strikes against cities and various targets in the territory of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

If we are going to talk about proofs of "goodwill", then it is the Soviet Union and the socialist States that are entitled to demand such proofs from the Western Powers. The attitude of the Western Powers to the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact is the touchstone on which it is easy to test the true orientation of the Western Powers' policy and their true plans. Our proposal for a non-aggression pact does not require of the Western Powers the fulfilment of any preliminary conditions. The implementation of this proposal would not affect anyone's defence or cause any prejudice to the sovereignty of any country: on the contrary, it would only help to strengthen the security of all countries.

The representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, in his statement today, noted the desirability of consultations between the Soviet Union and the United States, especially in periods of crisis (supra, p. 12). Why, then, has the representative of Italy not supported the proposal of the Soviet Union for the conclusion of a

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non-aggression pact? This pact provides for consultations between the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries whenever there is a threat to peace and security. While acknowledging the great importance of consultations, Mr. Cavalletti did not say a word about the fact that precisely the non-aggression pact proposed by the Soviet Union answers his purpose. It provides for consultations. We should like to hear from the representative of Italy a reasoned explanation of why the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact is unacceptable to Italy.

If the representatives of the Western Powers have any concrete, constructive comments or proposals in regard to any particular article of the draft pact, we are ready to listen to them. It was precisely for that purpose that the Soviet Union submitted its draft non-aggression pact to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

One of Mr. Cavalletti's previous statements, which, like an echo, reflected earlier statements of the United States representative, could be interpreted as meaning that the representative of Italy objects to the consideration of the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Mr. Cavalletti, as is clear from his statement, does not consider the framework of the Eighteen-Nation Committee "as appropriate and effective" -- these were his words -- for the discussion of the question of a non-aggression pact. What is it that Mr. Cavalletti does not like about the Eighteen-Nation Committee? What is there in this Committee that embarrasses him? What prevents us from discussing in this Committee a document of such importance and which certainly relates to reduction of the danger of war as the Soviet draft non-aggression pact? After all, the Eighteen-Nation Committee was especially set up by the General Assembly for the consideration of proposals of this kind. Perhaps the representative of Italy considers that the presence of neutralist States prevents its being discussed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee?

In our opinion, the Eighteen-Nation Committee, where States representing the main continents of the world are present, States which differ in their social and political systems, is a very suitable forum for the discussion of all questions relating to disarmament and to the elimination of the danger of war. All the more appropriate is the discussion of a non-aggression pact in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and those who are really interested in consolidating peace cannot afford

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to remain passive on-lookers in this matter. Unfortunately, however, in our Committee one can observe how some members prefer to remain aloof from this important discussion like a boy sitting on a fence and watching with curiosity what is going on in the yard.

Responsibility to one's own people and to the whole of mankind now demands more than ever that everyone should make active efforts towards reducing international tension and eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war.

The Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact provides a favourable opportunity to consolidate the forces which are struggling for peace and to make this struggle more vigorous. We are entitled to expect a proper attitude towards this Soviet proposal on the part of the countries represented on the Committee. We hope that those who have not yet expressed their opinion will not delay making their contribution to a successful solution of this problem, which is so important for the consolidation of universal peace.

There is another question which also opens up wide possibilities in this regard.

As one of the measures for reducing international tension the Soviet Union has submitted to the Committee a draft Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75). It cannot be doubted that the implementation of this Soviet proposal would help to a great extent to reduce international tension, to consolidate peace and to create favourable conditions for reaching agreement on disarmament questions. The presence of strategic means of delivery on foreign territories, as well as the presence of the military bases themselves on foreign territories, creates a completely abnormal situation in international affairs and is a factor which increases international distrust and causes extreme tension in the relations between States. These numerous United States military bases located in peace-time, eighteen years after the end of the Second World War, on foreign territories, thousands of miles away from the territory of the United States itself, are really a phenomenon which has no precedent in the history of mankind and which is fraught with the most serious consequences for international relations in our time.

At the meeting of our Committee on 5 April, the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Tarabanov, made a most significant quotation (ENDC/PV.118, p.23) from a resolution of the Federal Council of Churches, which asked that the United States should not seek military bases so close to the Soviet Union as to carry an offensive threat.

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One can only regret that this voice of reason and common sense was ignored by the ruling circles of the Western Powers; they passed it over in complete silence.

We have always declared, as we do now, that a radical solution of the question of normalizing the existing international situation would be the elimination of all foreign military bases on alien territories and the withdrawal of all foreign troops therefrom. The Soviet Government has repeatedly proposed measures of this kind, and it continues to urge them. It is greatly to be regretted that the Western Powers are unwilling to agree to this peaceful step. Moreover, they oppose even the discussion of such measures, the implementation of which would undoubtedly serve to a very great extent the interests of peace. At present, the Soviet Union proposes that a start be made to solve the problem of reducing international tension with a more modest measure. It proposes the adoption of a Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing the strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons. In this case it is not a question of destroying or even reducing the numbers of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. It is merely a question of putting an end to the use of foreign territories for stationing such means of delivery. Unfortunately, even in this question we met with objections on the part of the Western Powers. What reasons are given by the representatives of the Western Powers for their objection to the Soviet proposal? The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, in developing his "argument" against the draft Soviet Declaration asserted that the deployment, for example, of nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris missiles is — and I quote his words — "a major factor in maintaining the peace" and that "the replacement of Jupiters and Thors by Polaris is, in fact, a most substantial move in the direction of choosing a delivery system which makes war by accident, or war by miscalculation, far less likely." (ENDC/PV.115, pp.39-40).

As you see, Mr. Godber is concerned not about the elimination of nuclear war in general but only about war as the result of a mistake or miscalculation.

We cannot fail to note that the attempts of the Western Powers to make out that the replacement of land missile installations on foreign territories by nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles is a solution to the problem of eliminating the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons located on foreign territories, are completely futile. Such a replacement does not at all eliminate the danger arising from the use of foreign territories for the preparation of a nuclear attack on other countries. Nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris missiles, just the same as stationary missile installations, are weapons of surprise attack.

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The replacement of Jupiter and Thor missiles by Polaris is a clearly expressed process of intensification by the Western Powers of their military preparations, an intensification of the preparations for a military attack on the socialist countries. The assertion of the Western Powers that the transfer of United States nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles to the Mediterranean is intended to strengthen security in Europe is absurd.

The presence of nuclear submarines and surface ships with nuclear missile weapons in foreign ports, in territorial and other waters, means in fact a widening of the areas from which a nuclear attack could be launched. The implementation of such a measure by the United States and their NATO allies will have very serious consequences for the areas where the United States nuclear submarines are based and cruise about with the object of attacking the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. By taking this step the NATO Powers are undoubtedly enlarging the geographical area where the inevitable retaliatory measures would be applied when necessary. Nobody should be in any doubt that in the event of an armed conflict the laws of modern warfare will compel us to use all means to crush the aggressor immediately and to destroy in the shortest possible time, in the very first hours or even minutes of the war, both the fixed and mobile missile bases aimed at the vital centres of the peace-loving states, wherever such bases may be situated -- within any particular country, in ports, or on the high seas.

The assertion of the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, that Polaris missiles ensure stability in the world is completely unfounded. Mr. Godber, as well as other representatives of the Western Powers, should understand perfectly well that the socialist countries, against which all the military preparations of the North Atlantic bloc are directed, would be compelled to keep their weapons constantly trained on all the points, zones and areas where the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons belonging to the NATO Powers are deployed, whether they be fixed or mobile.

There is another important question, which with particular force shows the timeliness, I would say, the urgency and the extreme need for the measures proposed by the Soviet Union and contained in the draft Declaration and the draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

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In discussing disarmament problems and measures facilitating disarmament, we have repeatedly drawn the Committee's attention to the danger to peace and to the cause of disarmament which arises from the growth of militarism in the Federal Republic of Germany. The representatives of the Western Powers are unwilling to take into consideration the well-founded statements and warnings of the Soviet Union about the dangers of West German militarism. They say that these Soviet statements are prompted by an excessive suspicion of the West Germans. The speech made by the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, at the meeting of the Committee on 5 April is characteristic in this respect.

Sir Paul Mason said:

"If our Eastern European colleagues are so frightened about the alleged revanchist tendencies of the Federal German Republic, they ought to be thankful that the Federal German Republic is a member of NATO, and they ought to be the more thankful the more we can involve the Federal German Government in the work and in the obligations of that alliance and thereby prevent any tendencies which our Eastern colleagues think it may have to 'go it alone' and to use its own strength for its own nefarious purposes, as they are called. If the Federal German Government were indeed determined to act as is suggested, it would be much more dangerous if it were on its own. Moreover, if it were not involved with the rest of the Western alliance the chances of the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be so much the greater." (ENDC/PV.118, p.55)

Sir Paul Mason has developed before us a whole theory to justify the Western Powers bringing West Germany into NATO. He asserted that the involvement of West Germany in NATO served the purpose of restraining German militarism, and diverted it, don't you see, from carrying out its aggressive military plans. In reality the situation with regard to the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO is not at all as Sir Paul Mason tried to make us believe. The participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO opens the way to the use of NATO by the West German militarists for the accomplishment of their revanchist plans. The United States and the other NATO Powers, under the pressure of the Federal Republic's demands, are going further and further towards involving West Germany in the armaments race and providing it with the widest possible

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opportunities for equipping its forces with the most up-to-date types of armaments. This is shown by the growth of armaments in the Federal Republic of Germany. After the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany the Governments of the Western Powers assured the whole world that West Germany would have no army and would be allowed to form only police units. But only a couple of years after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany there came into being a plan to build "a European army", to include a West Germany contingent half a million strong. At that time the creation of "a European army" was defended by the Western Powers as a necessity for keeping the arming of West Germany under control and for preventing the Federal Republic of Germany from creating its own independent forces. The same arguments were used to "justify" the necessity for concluding the Paris agreements in 1954 and for including the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO. It was then affirmed, and we were given assurances, that these agreements and the participation of Western Germany in NATO would raise a barrier against the Bundeswehr being armed with powerful types of conventional armaments and would prevent the West German armed forces from being equipped with nuclear weapons.

As subsequent events have shown, all the assertions and assurances of that kind turned out to be empty phrases, a sham. They were a screen covering up plans for the extensive militarization of West Germany. All this is confirmed by indisputable facts.

Only a few years passed after the conclusion of the Paris agreements and Germany was given access to missile weapons. Already in 1960 the Bundeswehr received for its armaments the Honest John and Matador missiles which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. After a short interval the Federal Republic of Germany received for its armed forces the United States Sergeant and Pershing missiles, as well as Mace rockets which have a range of more than 1,000 kilometres. Furthermore, the restrictions on the production of modern armaments, including those on the means of delivery of nuclear weapons have been lifted one after the other from West Germany. Thus the restriction on the production by West Germany of ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles was removed as early as October 1959; a year later Germany obtained the right to build warships of up to 6,000 tons displacement, the intention being that it would build destroyers with a considerable range of action and capable of carrying ship-to-shore guided missiles. At the end

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of 1959 an agreement was concluded between the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany on the joint planning and building of tanks, as well as ground-to-ground missiles. Moreover, United Kingdom-West German co-operation in manufacturing anti-tank weapons, jet aero-engines and conventional shells for the navy was also contemplated. In 1960 the Federal Republic of Germany, together with the other Western Powers, made a start on the building of Starfighter F-104 jet aircraft, and also ground-to-air Hawk missiles. On 16 May 1961 a Franco-German agreement was concluded for the joint production of a number of types of tanks and helicopters and the creation of a radar system. Therefore we see that Western Germany is now taking a very active part in planning and producing the most modern types of armaments.

Not content with this, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1960 put forward its demand to be provided with nuclear weapons. At first these demands of the West German militarists were rejected by the Governments of the Western Powers. However, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany promoted a wide campaign of pressure on its NATO partners. At the session of NATO in Athens, the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany demanded the adoption of a proposal for the creation of a NATO nuclear force, which would include West German military contingents. As a result, a decision was taken to exchange information between the NATO partners on the role of the nuclear weapon in the defence of the alliance.

This decision did not satisfy the militarist circles of the Federal Republic of Germany, and towards the end of 1962, before the Paris session of NATO, they again demanded to be given access to nuclear weapons. Under the pressure of this demand the United States put forward a plan to create a NATO "multilateral" nuclear force. This plan was further developed in the agreement between the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. MacMillan, at Nassau in December 1962. Under this agreement the members of NATO would assign certain units of their national armed forces to the NATO multilateral nuclear force. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany eagerly snatched at the Nassau agreement, and it is now urging the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to implement this agreement as quickly as possible. It insists that the multilateral nuclear force should include not only nuclear submarines but also conventional submarines, as well as surface vessels. The West German

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Government has declared its readiness to provide German crews for ships carrying Polaris nuclear missiles, and has also declared its readiness to include in the NATO nuclear force some Bundeswehr formations of F.104 aircraft, capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It is reported that the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany are arranging for the use of West German ports in the Baltic and North Sea as bases for NATO submarines equipped with nuclear weapons. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has declared its readiness to bear one-third of all the expenses involved in the creation of the multilateral nuclear force. It calculates that by participating in the financing of a considerable share of the expenses involved in the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force it will be able to acquire a decisive voice in regard to the use of this force. Having begun with police formations thirteen years ago, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is now quite close to having its demands satisfied in regard to the most up-to-date weapon of mass destruction -- the nuclear weapon.

Therefore, the assertion of the representatives of the Western Powers and, in particular, of Sir Paul Mason, that the participation of Germany in NATO serves as a means of restraint on its arming, is an obviously false argument. We have heard assertions of that kind ever since the first steps were taken to rebuild the West German armed forces. We heard similar assertions when Germany was being included in NATO. The facts, however, show that the original police forces of the Federal Republic of Germany have been converted into large Bundeswehr formations, many hundred thousand strong, already amounting to more than half a million men, armed with the most up-to-date types of conventional weapons, while plans to equip the West German Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons are being carried out with kaleidoscopic speed. There is a striking similarity between the development of events which took place on the eve of the Second World War and what is taking place in our time. Thus, up to 1934 Germany had limited armaments and armed forces. Everyone remembers that in Germany at that time there was a Reichswehr approximately one hundred thousand strong. With the encouragement and favour of the Western Powers, Hitlerite Germany swiftly built up enormous armed forces which plunged Europe, and later the whole world, into the abyss of the Second World War. At the present time the original police contingents of the Federal Republic of Germany are being converted into powerful armed forces equipped with nuclear weapons, and this is being done with the encouragement and direct assistance of the Western Powers, and especially of the United States military leaders in the Pentagon.



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We hope that the Western Powers, if they really wish to lessen the tension in international relations, if they really wish to eliminate the threat of a nuclear missile war, will agree to adopt this Declaration without further delay, will agree to conclude a non-aggression pact and will agree to the establishment of a denuclearized zone.

We make an ardent appeal also to the non-aligned States represented in the Committee. Their importance and the fact that they can exercise a positive influence on the solution of these problems are beyond doubt. They can and must play their part to ensure the adoption of the measures proposed by the Soviet Union which are aimed, if not at completely eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war, at least at reducing it considerably. And this undoubtedly is in the interests of all nations.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I call on the representative of the United States, who wishes to exercise the right of reply.

Mr. STELLÉ (United States of America): We have been subjected once again this morning to a tiresome repetition of utterly unfounded attacks against the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany. We had hoped that by now the Soviet delegation and its allies would have realized that repetition of those false statements about the intentions of the West German Government can serve no possible purpose except to stall the progress of constructive work in this Committee. However, they continue to attempt to stir up hatred against a peaceful country not represented here, and they refuse to admit the true facts about the Federal Republic. I must, therefore, state once again the well known fact that the Federal Republic of Germany, which is a truly democratic State, has since the end of the Second World War made every effort to pursue a constructive and peaceful foreign policy.

We are all aware of the treaty of 1954 by which West Germany renounced entirely the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In addition, it has renounced the use of force for political ends, and specifically in connexion with its eastern boundaries. Since that time its military policy has been implemented exclusively within the context of the defensive NATO alliance, and its armed forces are entirely integrated within that defensive alliance.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The Federal Republic, however, is not free from the danger of attack. It is interesting to remember that it was East Germany which first began rearming after the war, and we now hear all too frequently grim reminders that West Germany faces potential aggression of all dimensions, including nuclear attack. For that reason the NATO forces in West Germany must be strong enough to protect this front line of the Western defence.

It is only right that, as a loyal member of the NATO alliance, West Germany should play a role in the alliance's military policy, and that it should be assured of adequate defence of its territory by that policy. But the nuclear warheads deployed on German territory among the NATO forces are entirely under United States and United Kingdom control. Any arrangements which might subsequently be worked out under the terms of a NATO multilateral nuclear force would not change the fact that the Federal Republic, as President Kennedy stated in his Press conference of 7 February, has no intention of developing its own nuclear national deterrent force. On the contrary, the NATO nuclear force would in fact inhibit the development of additional national nuclear forces, and the decision regarding the use of the nuclear weapons under NATO control would under no circumstances be made by individual national governments.

Let us hope that we have heard the last of these fake and empty charges against the Federal Republic and that the Committee may proceed to the business at hand.

Mr. LALL (India): Our delegation would like to make a few brief remarks on the problem of initial measures. We are glad that we are, to some degree at any rate, dealing with initial or collateral measures, having practically solved the procedural deadlock with which we were confronted for some time. Unfortunately, we have not solved that deadlock very tidily, and we would suggest to the co-Chairmen that they should keep under active consideration the importance of picking out by agreement between themselves items for serious negotiation from the general category of initial or collateral measures. Until then, of course, the Committee will continue to consider those issues under the present arrangement. That is to say, it will discuss all or any of the various items proposed for consideration by the members of the Committee.

(Mr. Lall, India)

It will be recalled that the Indian delegation itself, early last year, asked for the discussion of measures to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For the present, however, we are not going to speak on that issue because it is not directly before us, taking into account the contents of statements which have been made in the Committee, but we should like to offer some remarks on the present situation as we see it.

In spite of certain views to the contrary, there seems to be a search for modest beginnings in the general area of initial measures. Of course, as a category, they might be described as modest measures altogether, but even so we find that there is a realization that they do not in any sense take the place of disarmament itself.

We entirely agree with the representative of the United States, who said today (supra, p.6) that no limited measures should lull us into a state of complacency; no initial measures such as the test ban even, or the communications link, could eliminate the dangers of nuclear war, for example. Of course, that is so. Our primary task is to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Modest though they are, the initial measures are valuable. The United States has welcomed the agreement of the Soviet Union to the setting up of a communications link (ENDC/FV.118, p.52). We do not think that that measure was proposed and accepted because it was valueless. We think, rather, that the two sides attach a certain importance to it, an importance which has been mentioned by other delegations around this table, including our own.

We should like to point out that we agree also with what our colleague from Italy said today (supra, p.14), when he referred to the fact that, in connexion with general and complete disarmament, Mr. Godber has said -- more than once, I believe -- that the disarmament plan which is adopted by this Conference will be neither the disarmament plan of the West (ENDC/30) nor that of the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1), but a plan which emerges as a result of negotiation and which will be different from either of the plans now before us.

Mr. Cavalletti went on to say that, similarly, there must be consultation between the two sides on initial measures, and that there should not be the acceptance merely of measures from one side. We entirely agree with that thought. We have welcomed the acceptance by the Soviet Union of a measure proposed by the West. We have welcomed the desire to find modest beginnings. And we think that the co-Chairmen should continue their efforts to see whether they can negotiate seriously one of the measures proposed by the other side.

(Mr. Lall, India)

In that connexion we should like to make a suggestion. We do not make a proposal: we put it forward purely as a suggestion. We are in fact discussing half a measure proposed by the West -- not a full measure, but half a measure. That is to say, we are discussing the reduction of the risk of war: we are not discussing the aspect of that item which deals with surprise attack. In view of the desirability of making modest beginnings in this field we wonder whether it would not be possible to find in some of the Soviet proposals several stages, or two stages at least, which could be considered separately -- if the Soviet delegation agreed, of course.

For example, the representative of Poland pointed out (supra, p.16) that there were two aspects to the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact (ENDC/77). One aspect was that it would provide arrangements for joint consultations between the two sides; that is to say, between the NATO countries on the one hand and the Warsaw Pact countries on the other hand. The second aspect was that the two sides would formally bind themselves not to use force for the solution of their problems.

Mr. Tsarapkin pointed out (supra, p.25) that Mr. Cavalletti had talked today about the value of consultation between the two sides. I wonder whether it would not be possible for the two co-Chairmen, in the first instance, to see whether that element in the proposal which relates to arrangements -- perhaps informal arrangements -- for exchanges between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries, which are the two sides in this context, could not be considered as a first step in this particular issue which has been brought to us by the Soviet delegation and its Government. In other words, would it not be possible to consider an arrangement for consultation between the two sides?

We would suggest that that would be one aspect of the item, and since we are already discussing one aspect of one of the items -- namely the item on reduction of the risk of war and surprise attack -- we do not ourselves see any objection of principle to discussing one aspect of this other item which is before us. We offer this as a suggestion, as I have said; we are not making a proposal.

Our meetings on initial measures have always tended, in a sense, to be more informal than our consideration of general and complete disarmament. In fact, as is known, till recently we met in a special Committee for the purpose. So I make this suggestion **very** informally, and I make it because the issue which underlies the proposal for a non-aggression pact is

(Mr. Lall, India)

really the issue of relations between the NATO countries on the one hand and the Warsaw Pact countries on the other hand. It seems to us that it might be possible, in some such way as I have suggested, to make progress in the matter of assuring the world that the relations between the two blocs of countries do not reach any point of extreme and excessive danger which might erupt in warfare.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I also should like very briefly to exercise my right of reply. Everything that has just been said by the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, when he gave us fresh assurances that West Germany is a peace-loving State, and so on, and so on, does not at all accord with the facts and is in contradiction with them. That statement of Mr. Stelle's sounded clearly out of tune with the facts and the realities of life, and all this is so obvious that it seems to me that there is no need for any additional rebuttal on our part of what has just been said by Mr. Stelle.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and twenty second plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. J. Barrington, representative of Burma.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Italy, Poland, the Soviet Union and India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 22 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

